Critical Tasks Facing Western Europe and the United States in a Period of Change and Transition. Address by Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Department of State Bulletin, 7 June, 1971 by Hillenbrand,  Martin J.
Critical Tasks Facing Western Europe and the United States 
in a Period of Change and Transition 
Address by Martin J. Hillenbrand 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs 1 
I am distinctly honored to have the oppor-
tunity to address this distinguished Assembly 
of European parliamentarians on the critical 
tasks that face us as we stand on the threshold 
of the eighth decade of this 20th century. 
All of us here represent forms of government 
which, while differing perhaps in some insti-
tutional ways, are constituted basically to reflect 
the will of their people. This shared belief that 
governments derive their just powers from the 
consent of the governed springs, of course, from 
the noble and idealistic concepts that we in-
herited from European and American political 
philosophers and lies at the very heart of our 
common aspirations. 
In that regard this chamber recalls to me 
vividly a time nearly 20 years ago when I bore 
a diplomatic responsibility which lives in my 
memory as one most agreeable. Posted in Paris 
in the first years of the 1950's, I journeyed from 
time to time to Strasbourg to observe the pro-
ceedings of the ad hoc assembly called to draft 
a constitution for a European political com-
munity. Although that particular venture 
failed, it impressed on me the existence of 
powerful currentB of European idealism-
which in one form or another have since con-
tinued to flow through European life. This 
Assembly is one embodiment of that idealism 
and vision of a brighter future. 
The 20 years which have passed since first I 
1 Made before the Consultative Assembly of the 
Connell of Europe at Strasbourg, France, on May 18. 
June 7, 1971 
came to Strasbourg witnessed the United States 
and Western Europe striving together to re-
build shattered societies and rebuff Soviet 
expansionist pressures. Those efforts paid sub-
stantial dividends. Economic strength has been 
restored. A system of collective defense has 
provided a formidable shield against potential 
external aggression. An impressive movement 
toward European unity has been set in train. 
These moves, taken together, have allowed 
proud and ancient nations to ·be blessed with a 
period of peaceful development and concord 
probably unmatched in the long march of this 
continent's history. 
Such powerful strides of accomplishment 
have been of vital moment to the United States. 
For if we Americans are to be concerned with 
the building of a structure of world peace 
based on the concert of many nations, our bonds 
with a strong and peaceful Western Europe 
must be of paramount importance. 
It is, then, with all this in mind that we face 
the seventies. Undoubtedly, it will be a period 
of marked change and transition both inter-
nally and in our relations with one another: 
in the United States, a searching assessment of 
domestic and foreign priorities; in Europe, an 
unfolding sense of identity and independence. 
The broad direction of my country's course 
was charted by President Nixon in his report 
to the Congress last year on "U.S. Foreign 
Policy for the 1970's." 
Emphasizing that we have no intention of 
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withdrawing from the world, the President saw 
as the basic issue how we can be most effective 
in meeting our responsibilities, protecting our 
interests, and thereby building peace. To this 
end he considered that a more responsible par-
ticipation by our foreign friends in their own 
defense and progress would insure a more 
effective common effort toward the goals we 
all seek. 
Looking at the European scene, the President 
foresaw our relations resting on a firm tripod of 
considerations : 2 
In Europe our policies embody precisely the three 
principles of a durable peace: partnership, continued 
strength to defend our common interests when chal-
lenged, and willingness to negotiate differences with 
adversaries. 
American positions regarding the partner-
ship, shared strengths, and efforts toward 
detente will be grounded on these principles of 
policy in the era of transition and change that 
lies ahead. 
The Partnership for Security 
It is axiomatic that the security of Europe 
continues to be vital to the security of the 
United States, and the reverse is equally true. 
But it has become increasingly evident in re-
cent years that there are new factors that must 
be introduced into that equation. One has been 
the burgeoning prosperity of Western Europe 
and the resultant economic capability to shoul-
der a larger share of the burden of security; 
another has been the widening concern in the 
United States over mounting domestic chal-
lenges and a heightened sense on the part of 
many that for too long we have borne a dis-
proportionate share of the cost of free-world 
security. 
These factors were set against a backdrop of 
the broader question of a realistic evaluation of 
the current military threat to Western Europe 
and to the alliance. It was of prime import that 
a sensible stance of defense be devised that our 
• The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970, appears 
in the BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1970. 
744 
peoples in good conscience could be asked to 
support. 
Therefore, it was imperative that we analyze 
for the long term Europe's needs in realistic 
deterrence and defense. 
The results of the studies carried out in this 
connection in Washington and in NATO last 
year were of signal significance. The North At-
lantic Council ministerial meeting in Decem-
ber 1970, which completed the alliance study, 
was, in fact, as Secretary of State Rogers 
termed it, "one of the most important in the 
history of the alliance." 3 It was concluded that 
the United States and its NATO allies do not 
believe that war in Europe is imminent but 
believe that we must still face the possibility 
that under certain conditions it could occur. 
The military prowess of the Soviet Union and 
its allies has grown over the past 10 years and 
continues to wax. Crisis has been no stranger to 
Europe since the end of the Second World War, 
and it would be foolhardy to believe that it 
will soon relieve us of its shadow. As the annex 
to the communique noted : 4 
In addition to a capability to deter and counter 
major deliberate aggression, Allied forces should be 
so structured and organized as to be capable of deal-
ing also with aggressions and incursions with more 
limited objectives associated with intimidation or 
the creation of faits accomplis, or with those aggres-
sions which might be the result of accident or mis-
calculation. 
These findings led the United States and its 
allies to reaffirm their consensus that it is neces-
sary to have forces capable of deterrence and 
defense below the threshold of general nuclear 
war in order to provide a wide flexibility in re-
sponse to the threat or outbreak of hostilities. 
In view of this conclusion and despite con-
siderable pressure at home to draw down our 
forces in Europe for budgetary reasons, the 
President decided that given a similar approach 
by our allies, the United States would maintain 
and improve its forces in Europe and not reduce 
• For an excerpt from Secretary Rogers' remarks at 
New York, N.Y., on Dec. 10, 1970, see BULLETIN of 
Jan. 4, 1971, p. 6. 
• For text of a final communique and annex issued 
at Brussels on Dec. 4, 1970, see ibid., p. 2. 
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them without reciprocal action by our adver-
saries. That intent remains firm. 
Taking up the question of an equitable shar-
ing of alliance costs, the central intent of the 
Nixon doctrine is that our allies' primary re-
sponsibility is to shoulder their own. As Presi-
dent Nixon reported to the Congress this year: G 
The emphasis is no longer on their sharing the cost 
of America's military commitment to Europe-al-
though financial arrangements may play a part-but 
on their providing the national forces needed in con-
junction with ours in support of an effective common 
strategy. 
Our European allies pledged last December 
to strengthen their national defense establish-
ments and to initiate a new joint program to 
update the common infrastructure of NATO. 
Specifically, our colleagues in arms have com-
mitted themselves to a wide-ranging program 
totaling some $1 billion to be expended over 
the next 5 years. 
:My country believed that by maintaining and 
improving our forces in Europe we would be 
adopting those measures required to give heart 
to our European partners to assume more of 
the collective responsibility. 
This development of a stronger and more per-
vasive European voice in the alliance will en-
hance the sense of participation and purpose on 
the part of Western European countries and 
will lead to a sounder and more equitable bal-
ance of contributions to our mutual defense. 
Economic Opportunities and Problems 
The United States views with satisfaction the 
possibility of a widening membership in the 
European Community. 
We understand fully the political as well as 
the economic significance of the prospect that 
the Community may soon include most of the 
interested powers of Western Europe who in-
tend to embark on a course directed toward 
closer economic and monetary union. 
These developments are only one facet of the 
emergence of a well-defined European identity, 
1 The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25 appears in 
the BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1971. 
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an identity which will serve well the future 
needs of a seasoned and sound transatlantic 
partnership. 
It is obvious that there are differences of 
mature judgment in Europe on the significance 
of the initial measures taken to establish a polit-
ical consultative mechanism among Community 
countries and applicants to that establishment. 
But surely that is their own concern. 
In the economic realm we welcome also a 
larger and more robust Community because it 
is our considered conviction that the close-knit 
integration of such a wider geographic sweep 
can, with profit for all, lock into the larger 
economy of the free world as a whole. It is our 
belief that the dynamism of European economic 
integration will benefit our international trade 
and investment pattern as well as that of other 
third countries, and while it may be truistic to 
voice, there is also the expectation that greater 
economic responsibility will flow naturally from 
greater economic power. 
If that indeed were to be the case, none of us 
would view with equanimity a development by 
which, through a needless proliferation of spe-
cial preferential tariff arrangements, the world 
trading system would be carved up into a set 
of discriminatory blocs. 
For our common interest requires the pros-
perity of both Western Europe and the United 
States. This means freer and expanded trade 
and restraint in protecting special interests. We 
must work together toward a more equitable 
international trading system; we must envisage 
our self-interest in the broadest sense and fix 
our glass on basic rather than short-term goals. 
This docs not mean that in the natural course 
of events differences among us will not arise. 
They have and will. Varying views over prefer-
ential arrangements and over the effects on our 
trade of some of these arrangements, as well as 
policies in the field of agriculture, already have 
caused problems. But our vigorous pursuit of 
national interests should not be taken to connote 
a diminished support for European unity. In 
reality it reflects the emerging outlines of a true 
partnership based on a more balanced relation-
ship in which we would anticipate that the 
immediate domestic problems of Europe and 
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its close neighbors need not necessarily be solved 
invariably at the expense of those outside its 
pale. 
It would seem clear that as the European 
Community expands its membership and begins 
to focus more precisely on the prospects of 
economic and monetary union, heightened op-
portunities will exist but so, too, will compli-
cated and thorny new problems in the areas 
of international trade, investment, and mone-
tary relationships. Europe is striking out on 
new economic paths at the same time that J a-
pan's growing industrial plant and competi-
tive position in world markets is demanding 
equal and nondiscriminatory treatment in both 
Europe and North America. The time seems 
ripe for a detailed and deliberate study of the 
economic challenges and chances of the seven-
ties among the three major trading areas of the 
free world as well as their responsibilities and 
relations to the developing countries. I know 
that similar ideas are shared by prominent men 
of affairs in the world's major trading areas. 
To be most useful, such a study should be 
launched with dispatch so that an action pro-
gram for the decade ahead predicated on in-
creased liberalization in all economic fields 
could be readied for use at such time as the 
Common Market might be expanded. 
It could well be that the OECD [Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] is the most appropriate forum in which 
to conduct such a survey. After all, that Or-
ganization contains all the countries of North 
America, Western Europe, and Japan. Aus-
tralia will soon become a member. And it is 
plain to see that the OECD, in its first 10 years 
in being, has become the principal organ for 
consultation and coordination among the in-
dustrialized countries of the free world. 
Recent events in the international monetary 
field have focused attention once again on our 
mutual responsibilities in that regard. The 
United States has taken a number of steps to 
deal with the balance-of-payments problem, in-
cluding renewal of our control on capital in-
vestments. Most importantly, my country has 
acted vigorously to squeeze inflationary pres-
sures out of its economy. According to the most 
recent OECD studies, we have succeeded in 
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holding inflation rates below those of our major 
European partners. This progress, unhappily, 
has resulted in considerably higher unemploy-
ment than in most European industrial coun-
tries. · I am sure that our European friends 
recognize the social cost of these rates of unem-
ploymen~a cost which they themselves would 
probably find unacceptably high at home in 
most cases. They will, I am sure, recognize that 
this cost should not be prolonged and that 
growth without the resumption of inflationary 
pressures is the proper objective of U.S. policy. 
We all have a stake in a healthy and growing 
American economy. In such an economy pro-
ductivity will increase, and avoidance of infla-
tion should strengthen our competitive position. 
The best environment to improve our bal-
ance of payments exists when our economy is 
neither overheated nor underemployed. 
The United States has indicated that it will 
continue to review with foreign authorities 
their investment needs arising out of recent 
dollar inflows. 
In the meantime, the international monetary 
system is being upset by volatile flows of short-
term capital. Already we have taken action to 
take up some of these funds through borrow-
ings on the Euro-dollar market. 
This includes the issuance of specific instru-
ments to raise additional funds to "sop up" 
excess liquidity abroad and to assist with ap-
propriate investment outlets for foreign central 
banks. 
We continue to believe that the ultimate solu-
tion to balance-of-payments problems remains 
in the strengthening of the mechanisms of in-
ternational adjustment. Measures to improve 
our cooperative efforts to control flows of short-
term capital should be given a high priority. 
Cooperative Attack on Ecological Problems 
On another front are those problems peculiar 
to what is now labeled the postindustrial age 
which have descended upon you, as they have 
upon us. The triumphs of technology have had 
an impact upon the physical and social environ-
ment of modern societies, arousing justified 
alarm. Environmental problems are susceptible 
to control only on an international basis. The 
United States and its European partners are 
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in the van in cooperatively attacking these 
global problems. 
In our instance we have found suitable for 
organizing this common effort those Atlantic 
institutions which were devised originally for 
other purposes but have proved themselves 
adaptable to the changing emphases of a dy-
namic Atlantic relationship. The most recent 
and striking example was the creation within 
NATO of the Committee on the Challenges of 
Modern Society, which already has a series of 
pilot projects and associated conferences well 
underway. 
However, these ecological problems are enor-
mous and occupy every organization-from the 
United Nations, which is preparing an inter-
national conference for 1972 in Stockholm, to 
the activities of the Council of Europe and the 
European Community. 
Initiatives Toward Detente 
The 25 years since the end of World War II 
have been marked by a phenomenal recovery in 
the West followed by a virtually unparalleled 
burst of creative endeavor across the spectrum 
of man's activities throughout most of the 
Western World. Yet through all this, the tragic 
division of Europe has remained an over-
shadowing fact of life. 
President Nixon has committed the United 
States to inaugurate, if we are able, an era of 
negotiation with the Soviet Union and its al-
lies, which have so long confronted us as 
adversaries. 
This commitment to negotiation is central to 
my Government's approach to the entire mat-
ter of our bilateral relations with Eastern 
European countries and the Soviet Union, the 
foreign policy positions which we adopt jointly 
with our Western European partners, and our 
views toward initiatives which they may take 
with lands which lie to their east. 
Our hope for the decade ahead is that some 
progress, however slight, can be achieved. 
It would be naive to be too sanguine in that 
hope. lt""rom the Soviet vantage point it may 
well be that the risks of opening Eastern Eu-
rope to a freer reciprocal relationship with the 
obviously more dynamic countries of the West 
for now may appear too great-particularly in 
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the light of continuing evidence that most of 
those countries are finding it difficult in the 
extreme to develop growth economies and in-
stitutions capable of satisfying the basic human 
and psychological wants of their people. This 
should be viewed against the rising demand of 
all Europeans, both East and West, for better 
conditions of life more consonant with the 
needs and dignity of all men. 
If that demand be recognized, it would bear 
out those indications that the ruling cadres in 
Eastern Europe are beginning to give added 
weight in their decisionmaking processes to the 
pragmatic, nonpolitical needs of their popula-
tions. Observers note an ebbing in the high tide 
of ideological passion on the part of the leaders 
in the East, a shift from problem solving 
grounded on Communist dogma to approaches 
based on practical considerations of what will 
work. It is not surprising to find that such 
unorthodox thoughts have stimulated liberal-
izing pressures in the Soviet world. These forces 
clearly trouble the conservative establishment. 
The events in Czechoslovakia bear somber wit-
ness to that concern. 
But nevertheless one can discern that the 
broad character of relations between East and 
West is changing ·to a degree. Countries on both 
sides are searching for adjustments based on 
mutual advantage. 
For all this, steady patience is essential, for 
the experience of the past has taught that any 
marked change in the relationship between 
Eastern and Western Europe will not be easily 
brought about. 
We have recorded some successes. A treaty to 
bar the use of ocean seabeds for strategic offen-
sive purposes has been signed. A treaty to bar 
the acquisition and use of biological weapons is 
in an advanced stage of negotiation. 
Talks are going forward on the critical issue 
of limitation of strategic arms. If these talks 
are successful the world will be immeasurably 
safer from the threat of nuclear holocaust. 
In NATO itself we are continuing studies for 
the consideration of governments of a possible 
mutual and balanced reduction of the military 
forces which confront each other in Central 
Europe. We would hope at an appropriate time 
to engage the Soviet Union and its Warsaw 
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Pact associates in a negotiation which, success-
fully concluded, would lessen the military 
weight on European shoulders and our own 
while maintaining the current adequate level of 
Western security. In that connection we have 
noted Mr. Brezhnev's [Leonid I. Brezhnev, 
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party] recent statement that the Soviet Union 
stands for a reduction of armed forces and 
armaments in areas where the military confron-
tation is specially dangerous, above all in Cen-
tral Europe, and would study with interest a 
more detailed elaboration. 
The United States, with France and the 
United Kingdom, is conducting negotiations 
with the Soviet Union aimed at improving con-
ditions in and around Berlin. The negotiations, 
a useful touchstone of Soviet readiness to accept 
equitable solutions of real problems, have yet 
to make significant advance. Additionally, their 
reasonable resolution was linked by the Federal 
Republic of Germany to the first fruit of its 
imaginative policy of reconciliation and accom-
modation with the countries of Eastern Europe : 
West German ratification of its treaty with the 
Soviet Union. 
Eastern European governments in diverse 
ways have also taken initiatives toward detente. 
Most, as might be expected, have centered on 
intensified technical and commercial exchange. 
It would appear that at least in that regard the 
West has developed some of the answers to the 
problems of today's industrial societies. 
The Warsaw Pact countries in the political 
realm have proposed a conference on European 
security, although the proposed agenda would 
seem to touch not at all on the issue of security. 
It would be made up essentially of two points: 
steps to improve economic and cultural rela-
tions and the conclusion of an agreement to 
renounce the use of force in resolving issues 
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between European nations. Since all countries 
who are members of the United Nations have 
already sworn such renunciation and West Ger-
many-not a member-has taken such action 
unilaterally, it is difficult to envisage how such 
a limited conference might make a significant 
contribution to the current fragile texture of 
security in Europe. We are deeply interested in 
detente and in a genuine relaxation of tensions 
and will labor to gain them in any meaningful 
forum. We will negotiate on substance, but there 
must be solidity there and not just atmosphere. 
No matter how long it might take or how 
arduous the task, we are determined to carry on 
the search for peaceful settlement of the dis-
putes which divide us. Solutions need not be 
complete or final. A beginning will be sufficient 
reward. 
Too often perfection is sought in interna-
tional affairs based on some faulty concept of 
infallibility on the part of those who conduct 
them. This can never be. These tasks are always 
carried forward by mere men always liable to 
error and misjudgment. 
What is asked of us is that we keep up the 
effort-fully cognizant of our own limitations, 
and thus more tolerant of our failures and 
disappointments and equally of those with 
whom we deal. 
If diplomacy is the art of the possible, we 
must be willing to settle for just that. We will 
probably never obtain the optimum. Often we 
may have to accept the least undesirable. 
This is no argument for pessimism, but for a 
certain humility of spirit as we grapple with 
problems of concern to men the world over. 
If this be our goal and we go forward with 
good heart and firm resolve, I am confident we 
will leave things at least a little better for 
those who come behind. 
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